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Alfons Kenkmann
Universität Münster

Young working people in Germany
during first half of the 20th century1

1. Individual aspirations and official employment policy

1.1 The situation of young workers on the employment market
At the end of 1937 only a minority of young workers was still unemployed. In the area of the Labour Exchange of the Rhineland, being responsible also for the Saarland, the number of registered male youth being unemployed and without an apprenticeship decreased from 30,261 at the end of March, 1937, to 7,721 at the end of September, 1937. This moderate figure increased again in December, 1937, because 10,800 young people came back from different employments in official youth schemes and programmes intended to stabilise the German food production. 5,800 came from the obligatory LANDJAHR; 5,000 from the LANDDIENST and LANDHILFE. Part of these could not be supplied with apprenticeships.2

The inadequacies of the employment policy in supplying the participants in the agricultural food production programmes with apprenticeships were plain.3 In the area of the GAU Düsseldorf (national socialist administrative district) the national socialist officials established courses to supervise and to keep busy those returning young people who could not at once be provided with an apprenticeship.4 These courses were intended to prepare the young people in the district Ruhr-Niederrhein (lower Rhine) for their respective future occupations and by the tight regimenting of the courses keep away the young people from the pernicious influences of the street.5

The following data give evidence of the fact that as early as 1937 the situation on the employment market was considerably less tense than in the preceding years. In the GAU Essen 664 young male unemployed people met 737 vacant apprenticeships and in the GAU Köln-Aachen 1668 young people met 1,007 openings excluding those young people who were employed in the LANDJAHR and LANDDIENST.6

Already one year later the demand for apprentices could not be satisfied anymore with the available young school-leavers.7 The economic upturn had particularly positive results for the GAU Düsseldorf with its diversified metal producing and metal processing branches of industry. As early as 1937 there were 321 vacant apprenticeships per 100 young people.8

Skilled or semi-skilled workers had vanished completely from the unemployment statistics since the middle of 1938. These workers were needed as a result of the economic upturn and in particular an increased arms production. Especially in the metal processing and chemical industries, there were next to no unemployed workers.9 Because of the ”...WEHRMACHT orders coming in” the companies needed ”... every trained worker”.10

Compared to the figures of 1929, the output of the metal processing industry had doubled as early as 1939.11 From this time on a continuously increasing demand for workers was characteristic of the employment situation.12 As early as at the beginning of 1939 the national socialist planning officials estimated the number of additional workers needed to be at least one million.13 Considering this situation, it is not astonishing that young people became much sought-after employees.14 In Cologne in 1940/41 the bosses urged young employees not to attend vocational school. If the district courts imposed a fine on these young people, the money was returned to them in some cases by the factory owners.15

In 1939, the need for workers in Duisburg had reached an extent that made the local GESTAPO office intervene against a preventive detention ordered by the national GESTAPO office in Berlin. Because of the great need for workers in Duisburg the local GESTAPO official argued that ”the preventive detention (of the young people concerned) was likely to cause a very great strain in the face of the great need for workers”.16 The GESTAPO office in Düsseldorf shared the objection of their branch official. As a result the national GESTAPO office in Berlin lifted its order.17
In 1942 the REICHSJUGENDFÜHRUNG (leadership of the national socialist youth organisation) stated that young workers were treated generally ”less severe, ... because one was depending on them ...”.18 Through various employment regulations it was attempted to keep the demand for workers within certain limits. One of these initiatives consisted in shortening the duration of apprenticeships from four to three years. In other cases young people were released from vocational school ”because of the war”, before they had finished it.19

After the beginning of the war more and more conflicts of interest occurred between the WEHRMACHT on the one hand and the representatives of industry and commerce on the other. Both sides regarded their cause as having absolute priority. While the WEHRMACHT requested young workers after medical examination for military service, the business firms and concerns claimed them as labour power for themselves. The 20-year-old grinder Hans said at the GESTAPO in November, 1940, according to the interrogation record, that he had been medically examined and categorized as fit for military service (at the highest possible level Ers.Res.I) in 1939 and had then repeatedly gone to see the factory manager in order to be given leave for military service. But his employer had not given his consent.20

Conversely, young people lost their apprenticeships, if their bosses were drafted for service in the WEHRMACHT.21 By ”shutting down” and ”dragnetting” of factories the Labour Exchange offices tried to recruit a work-force to be ”flexibly used” for different purposes and to close the gaps which were generated as a consequence of the high conscription rate of the WEHRMACHT.22

Within 12 days after the beginning of the war in September, 1939, 640,000 workers were called up for military service. In March, 1940, the WEHRMACHT called for 750,000 men, although the arms production industry needed an additional 500,000 employees in order to be able to carry out orders of importance for the German war policy.23

In 1941 already 16.9 percent of all German industrial workers had been drafted for military service. But for workers in the mining industry the same statistics shows a considerably lower percentage of 11 percent.24 This explains the higher percentage of young people among the KITTELBACH PIRATES, a name certain subcultural cliques living in the lower Rhine mining area gave themselves in this region. These were frequently employed in mining, and thus their military service in the WEHRMACHT was for the time being deferred.

That the young KITTELBACH PIRATES had the status as adults at a very early stage in their lives, could be glimpsed from their criticizing and insulting the pupils of intermediate and upper secondary school who were members of the HITLERJUGEND (Nazi youth organisation): These were said not to know how to spend their time during holidays and to be reluctant in actively looking for work.25 As an unskilled worker a young person had much more money than an apprentice in one of the various occupations.26 A young worker easily earned two or three times more in 1936/37 than an apprentice working with a toolmaker or carpenter.27

Especially for the KITTELBACH PIRATES the ”fast buck” was often more important than to acquire specific skills. In addition, it was easier to show off in front of young females with some money in the pocket. These youth frequently worked because of the predominance of metal producing and processing industries in the GAU Düsseldorf in various occupations of these branches of production. Every tenth questioned person was a metalworker. Obviously this occupation was held by the young people much more often than by their fathers.28

As early as 1937 employment politicians recorded a ’huge influx’ of male young people into the occupations of the metal processing industries. In the district of the Labour Exchange for the Rhine region 36,750 young people applied for an apprenticeship in the metal industry. But they just met 14,550 apprenticeships being offered by employers.29 In 1939/40 for 26,400 apprenticeships in the metal industries there were 53,800 young applicants.30 A high official of the REICHSANSTALT FÜR ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG UND JUGENDFÜHRUNG in Berlin (Institution for employment and youth policy) stated in 1939, that among the young people ”... the interest concentrated more and more on a small number of occupations, especially on the occupations of panel beater, aircraft mechanic, precision engineer, office clerk and a few others. Other occupations, no less vital and of no lesser importance for the four-year plan, like farmer, miner or in some districts also construction worker, were avoided by the youth.”31 Leading functionaries like OBERREGIERUNGSRAT (high-ranking civil servant) Stäbler of the Labour Exchange for the Rhine region found that in 1940 the occupation of panel beater continued to be very much applied for by the youth in the Rhine region.32

Also at the HITLERJUGEND those youth were sought after who had qualifications as panel beaters.33 Already during the Weimar Republic it had been established through empirical research in Düsseldorf, that besides apprenticeships in the metal industries those in the automobile industry enjoyed an especially high reputation among young people.34 Interviews with pupils attending vocational school in the Westfalian industrial area at the beginning of the 1930s revealed that the young people rather wished to have become panel beater instead of the occupations they actually had.35 In spite of the otherwise epochal changes in 1945 young people were still strongly attracted to this ocuupation after the war. In May, 1947, interviews with male participants in a youth camp at the Blue Lake in Ratingen showed that the youth strove nearly exclusively for an apprenticeship as a panel beater.36

In comparison, the miner’s job had a completely different image among the young people. Already before the coming to power of the national socialists the youth had often tried to avoid work in the coal mines and the loss of prestige which went with it. They were grateful for any help by their families which prevented them from ending up in a ”miner’s career”.37 In the Third REICH this kind of negative attitude remained unchanged. Employment functionaries even spoke about a ”flight from mining”.38 Only 89 young people out of 3,400 which left lower secondary schools in Bochum at Easter, 1937 - that is not more than 2,6 percent - decided in favour of this occupation.

In 1937/38 the newly recruited miners still covered the needs of the coal mines in the Ruhr area by 73.9 per cent. This figure decreased in 1938/39 to a poor 34 per cent.39 Employment politicians stated, that in contrast with the situation in the Saarland in the Ruhr area ”... parents as well as the young people” showed ”a strong reserve in respect to this profession”.40

The demand for young miners in the Rhineland on the other hand could still be covered by the Labour Exchange offices in 1937/38.41 A social democrat from Rhineland-Westfalia reported in 1939: ’The regime is anxious about the lack of young blood, because whereas there was a tradition in earlier days that the sons of miners became miners as well, now the youth strive for different occupations.’42

In spring, 1941, the president of the regional Labour Exchange of the Rhineland interpreted the young people’s antipathies as resulting from ”... a certain mental attidude in respect to mining, for which it was hard to give reasons and which could be described really as a mining psychosis ...”.43 In the district of the regional Labour Exchange of the Rhineland only 835 persons out of the total of male young school-leavers as well as of the older clients of the year under review (1939/40) were willing to become miners. Thus, the need for young miners could just be covered at a level of 15 per cent. 53,800 persons on the other hand applied for an apprenticeship in the occupations of the metal processing industries.44

One of the national socialist specialists on labour market problems, van der Wyenburgh, stated in 1940 that employers had no adequate choice anymore among the youth who were prepared to start as miners. These volunteers were in fact now drawn from a group of pupils visiting schools for handicapped children and school-leavers who had dropped out early somewhere in the lower secondary school.45

In order to improve the attractiveness of the miner’s job, in 1940 an apprenticeship in mining was officially approved as being an education for skilled work.46 In the Westfalian industrial area there were numerous advertising campaigns in favour of mining in the local press.47 However, the effort and the new measures introduced in the attempt to give more value and prestige to the occupation of miner were of no avail. In the following years the mining companies and the regional Labour Exchange offices continued reporting strong reserve among the young people. The regional Labour Exchange for Westfalia suggested that school education ought to avoid painting the miner’s life in dark colours, because the question of ”... winning sufficient numbers of new workers for the mining industry was vital, not only for the branch of industry itself and for the whole economy but for nation and state in general. ... The reason for the decreasing efficiency of efforts directed at channeling young people into certain occupations may be seen above all in the young people’s and their parents’ strong reserve with regard to the occupation of miner.”48 We do not know whether teachers took up the suggestion of the regional Labour Exchange for Westfalia. If this was the case, then the attempt was obviously not successful: The decree on compulsory mining ”for all male Germans from 18 to 35 years...”, insofar as the persons concerned were physically fit, which was issued by the British authorities during the Allied occupation49, met with strong resistance among the young working people in the Rhenish-Westfalian industrial area, among the regional youth organisations and also among the catholic youth and the JUNGE UNION (youth organisation of the Christian Democrats CDU).50

In spite of the privileges to be expected, the traditional aversions of the young people remained unchanged. Thus, even after May, 1945, many young workers resisted compulsory mining by refusing to work and by intentionally going slow.

Other ”unpopular occupations” were those in farming and construction as well as some trades of craftsmen. The construction jobs had ”always had few young workers in the Rhineland ...”.51 This attidude comes as a surprise because masons and carpenters were to be found among the best paid tradesmen and skilled workers.52

The occupations of moulder and caster in the metal producing and metal processing branches of industry had an equally poor reputation. As early as 1923/24 both occupations were reckoned among young people to be very unattractive.53 Especially the young moulder was thought by people of the same age to be ”rough”.54 The negative image of the occupation of caster lived on well into the 1930s, for which the numerous call-ups of persons for essential service in this job give evidence.

The jobs chosen by young people not only provide information about the industrial milieu to which the young people belonged. They indicate in addition a particular system of values in respect to the different occupations existing in the youth subculture studied, which is to be understood as being specific for a particular social milieu.

Only little was left of the reputation once enjoyed by those traditional trades which had been widely practised before the era of advanced industrialisation. Already the young people in the 1920s evidently tended to have a negative view of occupations like baker, tailor, shoemaker, saddler/upholsterer, hairdresser, plumber, butcher and paper-hanger.55 Thus it is clear that in the course of time the profiles and the attractiveness of certain occupations underwent remarkable changes.

1.2 Employment of young people under conditions of intensified arms production

It was characteristic of the situation of young workers at the end of the thirties that there was a steadily increasing number of restrictions in the individual choice of occupations as well as call-ups for essential services. The necessary rise in arms production was intended to be reached by new piece rates, higher wages and extended working-time.

It is true that according to the GESETZ ÜBER KINDERARBEIT UND ÜBER DIE ARBEITSZEIT VON JUGENDLICHEN (Law on child labour and the working hours of young people), adopted April 30, 1938, it was not allowed to let young people under 18 years work in night shifts or alternating shifts. However, in practice the law was undermined by special orders and regulations. It was, for example, possible to hire over 16-year old young people like before for a 54-hour week.56

On September 1, 1939, the order limitating the working-time of male employees and workers was suspended by the VERORDNUNG ZUR ABÄNDERUNG UND ERGÄNZUNG VON VORSCHRIFTEN AUF DEM GEBIETE DES ARBEITSRECHTS (Decree on the amendement and supplementing of regulations in the field of industrial law). Another decree of September 11, 1939, modified the regulations which were until then in force with regard to the working-time of young workers. From now on a ten-hour working-day was allowed. Excluding the times at vocational school the maximum working-time of young workers older than 16 years was even 56 hours per week.57 Already before this it was possible under a special order of December 23, 1938, to employ young workers older than 16 years in the metal producing industry in weekly alternating shifts for nine hours per day and up to a maximum of 54 hours per week.58

A young tool grinder from Duisburg reported according to the interrogation record, that his working day at the DEMAG started in the morning at 6h15 and ended every day in the evening at 6h15.59 Many young workers mostly just had every third or fourth weekend off.60 Under these conditions the weekend trips of the informal youth groups were of great importance for different experience and regeneration.

Young people tried to evade the increasing demands put on them and the call-ups by changing their places of work. In this they did profit from the competition between the concerns and companies in wooing the insufficient number of workers being available on the labour market.

The willingness to change jobs varied according to employment status and industrial branch. The metal producing industry was spared from this movement of personnel fluctuation for the most part, but not the construction industry.61 Semi-skilled blast furnace workers and steel workers could hardly get equal employment conditions through changing the company. Workers skilled in machine engineering as part of the metal processing industries on the other hand were very much sought after.62 But skilled workers had the tendency to remain attached to their factory, while male unskilled workers tended most to change jobs.63 The higher income made some youth even change to the unpopular mining industry. The 17-year old later miner and member of a clique of young people, Karl S., changed from the iron and steel works GUTEHOFFNUNG, where he had been employed as an errand boy, to the coal mine KONKORDIA, because he just wanted to earn more money.64

For those young people who worked in the chemical plants of the IG FARBEN and the RUHRCHEMIE the demand for workers made it possible to draw away from the dangers for their health at their respective workplaces and find themselves another employment.65

In order to reduce and possibly prevent a change of employment among skilled metal workers, the national socialist employment politicians introduced a number of new restrictive regulations. Since the ANORDNUNG ÜBER DEN ARBEITSPLATZWECHSEL VON GELERNTEN METALLARBEITERN (decree on employment changes of skilled metal workers), issued December 29, 1934, a skilled metal worker had needed the approval of the respective Labour Exchange office, if the job newly applied for and the place of residence were not located in the same district. But in the metal industries a change of employment inside the district of an employment office was possible, until the order of the president of the REICHSANSTALT FÜR ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG UND ARBEITSLOSENVERSICHERUNG (highest national socialist institution for employment and social insurance) of February 11, 1937, was issued. From this date on workers needed a written permission from the responsible Labour Exchange for any change of jobs even inside the district. The same was decreed for the construction industry fifteen months later.66

Before that, on November 5, 1935, the GESETZ ÜBER ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG, BERUFSBERATUNG UND LEHRSTELLENVERMITTLUNG (law on employment exchange, careers guidance and placing of apprentices) had been passed, which assigned to the REICHSANSTALT FÜR ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG UND ARBEITSLOSENVERSICHERUNG by law the monopoly in the field of dealing with employment problems.67

The GESETZ ÜBER DIE EINFÜHRUNG DES ARBEITSBUCHES (law on the introduction of a compulsory worker’s log), passed in February, 1935, had been put into practice as early as September, 1936, for the most important occupations, where workers were really needed, while it was completely applied to all occupations around spring, 1939, with the handing out of 22 million worker’s logs.68 When starting an employment, the worker or employee had immediately to hand over for safekeeping the worker’s log to the factory manager, and in case of unemployment he/she had to present it to the Labour Exchange without special request. The worker’s log was intended regulate the distribution of workers within the German economy in an appropriate way.69

Finally the DURCHFÜHRUNGSVERORDNUNG ZUR DIENSTPFLICHTVERORDNUNG (order regulating implementation of the decree on call-ups), issued March, 1939, reduced the possibilities of free choice of employment even further and did not allow any change of employment without approval of the responsible Labour Exchange office.70 The hoped for success of these measures apparently did not come about, as on September, 1, another new regulation was issued: the VERORDNUNG ÜBER DIE BESCHRÄNKUNG DES ARBEITSPLATZWECHSELS (decree on the restriction of employment change). It was designed to suppress intiatives of the workers even more effectively.71 A factory which hired an apprentice needed the approval of the employment office. The distribution of the apprentices was carried out from this date on by means of a ”numerical fixing ... for the different professions in order to limitate the ... excessive influx of young people in the popular professions”.72

The constant flow of decrees was nevertheless not sufficient for limiting the employment changes of the young people very much. For this the examples of many clique members give evidence in the years 1937 to 1941. The national socialist employment politicians therefore introduced the call-ups as a further restrictive measure, beginning in June, 1938, with a partial call-up. Following this decree, a German worker was forced for a limited time ”... to do service at a working place assigned to him”.73

In February, 1939, an additional order extended the legal possibility for call-ups to unlimited time.74 Half a year later even school children from 10 to 16 years could be called-up for agricultural work in reference to the VERORDNUNG ÜBER DEN EINSATZ DER ÄLTEREN SCHULJUGEND (decree on the employment of the elder school children).75

What then was the internal differentiation of the production milieu of sub-cultural youth in the material under review? Out of 1,441 young clique members nearly a third (if also the young miners are added) underwent vocational training at the time of the GESTAPO interrogations. Every second (50.6 per cent) out of a total of 1,441 persons had an occupation identified as skilled work by industry and trade. 28.6 per cent were unskilled and 6.1 percent semi-skilled workers.

The 313 different occupational denominations appearing in the interrogation records are widely spread over the various branches of the economy. However, certain occupations are named especially frequently. To these belong in particular the generally unpopular occupation of miner but also the occupations of metalworker (5.4 per cent) and machine fitter (3.5 per cent) which enjoyed a high reputation.76 Also named were the occupation of lathe operator (4.9 percent) and that of apprentice for being office clerk (4.0 per cent). Every sixth person questioned (18.9 per cent) spoke explicitly of being worker or unskilled worker.77

The frequent naming of the occupations of metalworker and lathe operator reflect the strong position of the metal producing and processing industries in the region of Düsseldorf. But it is surprising how much the choice of occupations had changed in a comparison of the generations. While only 2.9 per cent of the questioned persons were miners, every tenth father of persons questioned worked in this field.78 In their attempt to give a higher value to the miner’s job, the national socialist employment politicians had visibly failed.

1.3 Refusal of work on the side of the clique members - staying away from work and working slow intentionally

Many clique members reacted by certain forms of ”refusal of work” to call-ups for unpopular jobs and a working week sometimes ranging from 60 up to 72 hours.79 The offence of breaking the contract of employment ”spread during the years of war like an epidemic, so to speak, among the youth”.80

Many young people refused the ”well-ordered rhythm of the war economy”.81 The 16-year old unskilled worker Bernhard K. declared according to the GESTAPO interrogation record: ”Later I came to the coal-mine WALSUM. I did not like it there, and therefore I stayed away from work arbitrarily for part of the time. Once, e. g., I stood away from work for 17 weeks.”82 The 15-year old EDELWEISS PIRATE (another name for the clique members) Heinrich H. from Krefeld who was in an apprenticeship as smith at the DEUTSCHE EDELSTAHLWERKE (in Krefeld) ”idled around” because the Labour Exchange did not endorse his employment application.83

The DAIMLER-BENZ A.G., Düsseldorf, denounced an EDELWEISS PIRATE to the GESTAPO: He was described as ”a great idler”, ”not appearing for much of the working week”, ”arriving too late very often”, being in fact ”sluggish at work”, so that he could ”indeed be described as work shy. No other boy had given them ”... so much trouble up to now...”.84 Other EDELWEISS PIRATES justified their ”idling around” with wages being too low, at least in their opinion.85

Furthermore, it was tried often to avoid unwanted employments by volunteering for the WEHRMACHT.86 This way of refusing work took up an extent among the youth which made the GAUARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT (gau association) Ruhr/Lower Rhine suggest in 1942 that ”... the military recruitment offices should deliver the acceptance notice in the case of volunteers, if possible, directly before the actual conscription and should include in the text of the acceptance notice that the acceptance would be revoked, if it was found that obligations at the level of employment would be neglected”.87

In the eyes of the Nazi inspectors young people who had ”... broken their contracts of employment” and ”idlers” were not only ”morally in danger” but already ”delinquent”. A court in Essen described the youth Manfred K. from Essen as ”delinquent” because he had ”no understanding that these days everybody had to do his duty at his place of work”.88

Under Allied occupation this argument was retained: ”Refusal of work” would favour ”among minors a tendency towards other forms of delinquency and criminal offence ...”.89 In 1949 Rudolf Sieverts from Hamburg, professor for criminal law and for law relating to young people, depicted a true horror scenario of the future. He did this for the case of decreasing efforts in ”...fighting the more and more widespread phenomenon of unwillingness to work which was becoming a habit of many young people, wandering between the occupation zones and earning their living either on the black market, or by all sorts of criminal behaviour, or by prostitution”. In this case, he said, there was a danger ”... that out of these work shy vagabonds organised gangsterism would develop in ways until then not known in Europe”.90

It is not surprising that in this atmosphere the prosecution of so-called young ”idlers” was sometimes no less rigid under Allied occupation than under the Nazi regime. The court for the district of Wuppertal delivered a 5-month prison-sentence to a young woman in 1947 with reference to the decree No. 54 of the military government, because of ”refusal of work”. At the instigation of the youth welfare department the young woman ”... had been called-up by the Labour Exchange office for working in a factory as unskilled worker. It was intended to prevent her from idling around and mixing with soldiers of the Allied occupation forces. At the beginning of 1947 she was given a medical certificate for several weeks because of illness. However, after recovery she did not take up work again and always used feeble excuses.” 91 This then led to the sentence mentioned above.
Very soon the refusal of work by young people threatened to take on such dimensions in the perspective of the responsible institutions that they felt forced to intervene. To the Labour Exchange of Wuppertal it seemed advisable to point repeatedly and explicitly to the official policies and measures taken against those ”refusing work” and ”idling around”. The Labour Exchange announced it would ”... take effective measures in all cases of unauthorised staying away from work”. It was seen as unacceptable ”... that these work shy elements lived at the expense of the working population”. More than ever it would now be ”... the duty of all to achieve the highest possible production rate”.92

A person being called-up for essential service and refusing ”... to do the work assigned to him ...” could be excluded from the food apportionment. A person not obeying an order to work had ”... to be prepared for severe punishment from the responsible military government court” according to article II, clause 21 of the decree No. 1.93

The local youth welfare departments tried to keep young people out of possible sanctions ordered by the military courts.94 In order to achieve this they proposed to order a temporary transfer to homes for bettering youth ”in cases of persistent idling around”. Thus it would be possible for the Labour Exchange offices ”... to prevent the reporting of young people to the military court”.

Nevertheless, the Labour Exchange offices never were in doubt about the necessity of sanctioning the unwillingness of young people to work.

1This article is based on my dissertation Wilde Jugend. Lebenswelt großstädtischer Jugendlicher zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise, Nationalsozialismus und Währungsreform (= Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens 42) (1996). For a closer look at the sources the reader is referred to that publication. For help in translating the present material I would like to thank Bruno Kirchhoff. Back
2cf. Walter Stets, Der Arbeitseinsatz der jugendlichen Schulentlassenen im Rheinland, Die Rheinprovinz, 13 (1937), 825-828, 826. Back
3cf. interrogation record Paul N., Gladbeck (September 1937), Nordrheinwestfälisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (NWHStAD), Bestand Gestapo-Personenakten (BW 58), Bd. 47601. Back
4cf. W.K. (Gauamt für Volkswohlfahrt), Wert und Zielsetzung der Betreuungs- und Beschäfti gungskurse für erwerbslose Jugendliche im Gaubereich Düsseldorf, Die Rheinprovinz 12 (1936), 194-196, 196. Back
5Gerd Ohletz, Betreuungskurse jugendlicher Erwerbsloser, Die Rheinprovinz 13 (1937), 262-263, 262.
6cf. Stets (1937), 825. Back
7cf. Walter Stets, Nachwuchspolitik in Krieg und Frieden, Die Rheinprovinz 16 (1940), 44-48, 46. Back
8cf. Stets (1937), 827. Back
9Rüdiger Hachtmann, Industriearbeit im ”Dritten Reich”. Untersuchungen zu den Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen in Deutschland 1933-1945 (= Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 82) (1989), 38. Back
10Schreiben der Duisburger Firma Heinrich van Lackum an das Arbeitsamt Essen (11. Oktober 1939), NWHStAD, RW 58/68205, Bl. 12.
11Hachtmann (1989), 27. Back
12cf. Martin Rüther, Arbeiterschaft in Köln 1928-1945 (= Kölner Schriften zu Geschichte und Kultur 16) (1990), 227. Back
13Hachtmann (1989), 46. See also Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiteropposition im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, in: Detlev Peukert and Jürgen Reulecke (Ed.), Die Reihen fast geschlossen, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm Nationalsozialismus (1981), 293-313, 296f; also id., Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, (21978), 208ff., 221ff. Back
14Cliquen- und Bandenbildung unter Jugendlichen, Denkschrift der Reichsjugendführung (September 1942), Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), Bestand Reichsjustizministerium (R 22), 1177, Bl. 325-395, Bl. 332. Back
15Bericht des Kölner Oberlandesgerichtspräsidenten an das Reichsjustizministerium (31. August 1941), BAK, R 22/3374, Bl. 51. Back
16Bericht der Gestapoaußendienststelle Duisburg an die Stapostelle Düsseldorf (2. Juni 1939), NWHStAD, RW 58/48457, Bl. 119. Back
17cf. Bericht der Stapostelle Düsseldorf an das Geheime Staatspolizeiamt Berlin (15. Juni 1939), NWHStAD, RW 58/48457, Bl. 16; Schreiben des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes Berlin an die Stapostelle Düsseldorf (2. Juli 1939), NWHStAD, RW 58/32943, Bl. 15. Back
18Cliquen- und Bandenbildung unter Jugendlichen, Denkschrift der Reichsjugendführung (September 1942), BAK, R 22/1177, Bl. 325-395, Bl. 332. See also Hans Stahlschmidt, Schutzpolizei in Düsseldorf. Organisation, Einsatz und Verwendung - Eine Chronik über mehr als ein halbes Jahrhundert, in: Hans Lisken (Ed.), Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf und die Polizei. 50 Jahre Polizeipräsidium Jürgensplatz (1983), 106. Back
19cf. NWHStAD, Bestand Sondergericht Düsseldorf (Rep. 114) Bd. 8529, Bl. 182. Back
20Interrogation record Hans F., Essen (November 1940), NWHStAD, RW 58/43761, Bl. 15. See also NWHStAD, RW 58/68508, Bl. 48; interrogation record Josef G., Düsseldorf (1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/63208, Bl. 11.
21Interrogation record H., Düsseldorf (1942), NWHStAD, RW 58/29376, Bl. 40. Back
22cf. Wolfgang Franz Werner, ”Bleib übrig!, Deutsche Arbeiter in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft (= Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens 9) (1983), 81ff. Back
23cf. Mason (1978), 225. Back
24cf. Kräftebilanz der deutschen Industrie, BAK, R 12 I/79 according to Ulrich Herbert, Arbeiterschaft im ”Dritten Reich”, Zwischenbilanz und offene Fragen, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 15 (1989), 320-360, note 58, 353. Back
25Oberhausener Kittelbachpiraten an die Hitlerjugend in Oberhausen (undated [1941]), NWHStAD, RW 58/9213, Bl. 21. Back
26cf. Gustav Vogel, Das Milieu des Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiets im Hinblick auf seine Kriminalität, Diss. med. (1938), 53. Back
27cf. NWHStAD, Bestand Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht Düsseldorf (Rep. 17), Bd. 397. Back
28The job of metalworker obtained in the group of the fathers only 4.4 per cent of the values. Back
29cf. Stets (1937), 826.; cf. Michael Zimmermann, Ausbruchshoffnung. Junge Bergleute in den dreißiger Jahren, in: Lutz Niethammer (Ed.), ”Die Jahre weiß man nicht, wo man die heute hinsetzen soll”. Faschismuserfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet (= Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930-1960, vol. 2) (1983), 102. Back
30cf. F. Stäbler, Die ”Freiheit der Berufswahl”, staatspolitisch gesehen, Die Rheinprovinz 17 (1941), 69-77, 70. Back
31Walter Stets, Planmäßige Nachwuchslenkung und Jugendführung, Die Rheinprovinz 15 (1939), 173-175, 173; cf. also Hans Langenberg, Untersuchung über die pädagogischen Grundlagen des Düsseldorfer Erziehungsversuches und den Lebenskreis der Jugendlichen, in: Verwaltungsausschuß des öffentlichen Arbeitsnachweises Düsseldorf (Ed.), Erwerbslose Großstadtjugend. Ein Düsseldorfer Erziehungsversuch an erwerbslosen Jugendlichen (1925), 69; Stäbler (1941), 71; Walter Blumenfeld, Jugend als Konfliktsituation, Jugendpsychologie mit Berücksichtigung des jüdischen Kindes (= Passauer Schriften zur Psychologiegeschichte 8), (1988), 92. Back
32cf. F. Stäbler, Die Berufsnachwuchslenkung im Kriege, Die Rheinprovinz 16 (1940), 41-43, 43; interview Walter T. (born 1922), Wuppertal (6. Dezember 1989). Back
33cf. Ewald Schürmann, Dortmund - nordwärts wird erzählt, in: Stadt Dortmund - Kulturbüro (Ed.), Nordstadtbilder. Stadterneuerung und künstlerische Medien (1989), 46.
34 Langenberg (1925), 63. Back
35cf. Hermann Wagener, Der jugendliche Industriearbeiter und die Industriefamilie (= Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik A/9) (1931), 60.
36cf. Rheinische Post 2 (1947) (16. Juli 1947). Back
37cf. Heinrich Többen, Die Jugendverwahrlosung und ihre Bekämpfung (1922), 161; Wagener (1931), 61f. Back
38K. Bax, Der deutsche Bergmann im Wandel der Geschichte, seine Stellung in der Gegenwart und die Frage seines Berufsnachwuchses, Zeitschrift für das Berg- und Salinenwesen im Deutschen Reich 88 (1940), 145-195, 185f; Stäbler/Bäumer, Die Entwicklung des Berufseinsatzes der Jugendlichen im Rheinland in der Zeit von 1933 bis heute, Die Rheinprovinz 15 (1939), 168-172, 171; Paul Seiler, Berufsziel Bergmann, Das junge Deutschland 36 (1942), 306-309. Back
39cf. Der deutsche Bergbau ohne Jugend, Das junge Deutschland 31 (1937), 456-461, 547. See also Barbara Dorn and Michael Zimmermann, Bewährungsprobe, Herne und Wanne-Eickel 1933-45, Alltag, Widerstand, Verfolgung unter dem Nationalsozialismus (1987), 146; cf. Ullrich, Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten im Bergbau, NS-Frauenwarte 10 (1941/42), 197; Zimmermann (1983), 125. Back
40Stets (1937), 827. Back
41Stäbler/Bäumer, 171. Back
42Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Sopade) 6 (1939), (61982), 737. Back
43Stadtarchiv (StA) Gladbeck, C 643. Back
44cf. Stäbler (1941), 70. Back
45cf. van der Wyenburgh 1940, cited according to Zimmermann (1983), 107; interview with Bernhard Röppel, Bottrop, Beitrag im Rahmen des Schülerwettbewerbs Deutsche Geschichte um den Preis des Bundespräsidenten, Wettbewerb ”Alltag im Nationalsozialismus. Die Kriegsjahre in Deutschland” (1983), 7; Anselm Faust (Ed.), Otto Faust, Vom Bremsjungen zum Betriebsdirektor, Ein Leben im Ruhrbergbau (1867-1914) (1989), 75. Back
46cf. H. Wetzel, Erfahrungen bei der planmäßigen praktischen Ausbildung des bergmännischen Nachwuchses in dem Untertage-Lehrrevier Amalia, Glückauf 77 (1941), 128-130; Friedrich Kröker, Die praktische Ausbildung der Berglehrlinge - Versuch der Aufstellung eines Grundlehrganges, Glückauf 78 (1942), 90-95; Gerhard Lehmann, Der Berglehrling und seine Ausbildung, Glückauf 79 (1943), 424-427. Back
47cf. Dorn/Zimmermann (1987), 146; see also the film ”Ein Bergmann will ich werden” (anonymous), Glückauf 78 (1942), 705. Back
48Bericht des Präsidenten des Landesarbeitsamtes Westfalen in Dortmund an die Regierungspräsidenten in Arnsberg und Münster über die Behandlung des Bergmannsberufes im Schulunterricht (4. April 1941), StA Gladbeck, C 643. See also Schreiben des Beauftragten des Reichstreuhänders der Arbeit für das Wirtschaftsgebiet Westfalen-Niederrhein an den Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit, Sachgebiet II, Essen (3. Juli 1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/26003, Bl. 11; interrogation record Alfred R., Essen (Oktober 1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/59120, Bl. 17. Back
49Mensch und Behörde müssen sich verstehen. Ein Gespräch mit dem Leiter des Arbeitsamtes Düsseldorf, Rheinische Post 1 (1946), 61 (28. September 1946). Back
50cf. Katholische Jugend gegen Bergbaupflicht (anonymous), Rheinische Post 1 (1946), 81 (7. Dezember 1946); Jugend protestiert gegen den Zwang (anonymous), Rheinische Post 2 (1947), 6 (22. Januar 1947). See also Heinrich Telaak, Das Nachwuchsproblem im Steinkohlenbergbau der Montan-Union, Diss. oek. (1954).
51Stets (1937), 827. Back
52cf. Langenberg (1925), 69. Back
53cf. ibid., 63; cf. Hermine Albers, Die soziale Lage der Jugend und die Aufgaben und Probleme der öffentlichen Jugendpflege, Jahrbuch der Jugendarbeit 1 (1949), 47-57, 54. Back
54Günther Dehn, Die männliche proletarische Großstadtjugend, in: Adolf Busemann (Ed.), Handbuch der pädagogischen Milieukunde (1932), 232; see also Stets (1937), 826. Back
55cf. Langenberg (1925), 40; Dehn (1932), 232; interview Walter T., Wuppertal; Stets (1937), 827. Cf. SOPADE-Berichte 5 (1938), 546.; cf. interrogation record Emanuel T., Essen, NWHStAD, RW58/5083, Bl. 14. Back
56cf. Erika Müller, Die neuen Jugendschutzbestimmungen, Die Rheinprovinz 14 (1938), 394-398, 397; Matthias Frese, Betriebspolitik im ”Dritten Reich”, Deutsche Arbeitsfront, Unternehmer und Staatsbürokratie in der westdeutschen Großindustrie 1933-1939 (= Forschungen zur Regionalgeschichte 2) (1991), 361ff. Back
57cf. Wolfgang Franz Werner, Bleib übrig! Deutsche Arbeiter in der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft (= Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalen 9) (1983), 41f. Back
58cf. Hisashi Yano, Hüttenarbeiter im Dritten Reich. Die Betriebsverhältnisse und soziale Lage bei der Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein und der Fried. Krupp AG 1936 bis 1939 (= Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 34) (1986), 77.
59cf. NWHStAD, RW 58/57120. Back
60cf. interrogation record Johann T., Gladbeck (November 1937), NWHStAD, RW 58/10740, Bl. 55; interrogation record Rudolf J., Düsseldorf (September 1940), NWHStAD, RW 58/13128, Bl. 7, interrogation record Josef G., Düsseldorf (1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/63028, Bl. 12. Back
61Yano, 108. Back
62cf. Rüdiger Hachtmann, Die Arbeiter der Gutehoffnungshütte 1933 bis 1939, Klaus Tenfelde (Ed.), Arbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert (= Industrielle Welt, Schriftenreihe für moderne Sozialgeschichte 51) (1991), 105-141, 120f. Back
63cf. Rüdiger Hachtmann, Arbeitsmarkt und Arbeitszeit in der deutschen Industrie 1929-1939, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte XXVII (1987), 177-227. Back
64Interrogation record Karl. S., Oberhausen (November 1938), NWHStAD, RW 58/25820, Bl. 7; cf. also interrogation record Peter P., Oberhausen (Juli 1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/9213, Bl. 133; interrogation record Otto S., Wuppertal (September 1939), NWHStAD, RW 58/72029, Bl. 2; interrogation record Georg R., Oberhausen, NWHStAD, RW 58/47520, Bl. 8. Back
65cf. interrogation record Kurt J., Wuppertal (1940), NWHStAD, RW 58/9457, Bl. 25; interrogation record Peter P., Oberhausen (Juli 1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/9213, Bl. 133.
66cf. Reichsarbeitsblatt (RABl) I (1935), 12; Hachtmann (1989), 44. Back
67cf. Reichgesetzblatt (RGBl), I (1935), 1281.
68cf. ibid., 311. Back
69Kühne-Erfurt (Revisor), Das Arbeitsbuch und seine Bedeutung für den Arbeitseinsatz, in: W. Sommer (Ed.), Die Praxis des Arbeitsamtes, Eine Gemeinschaftsarbeit von Angehörigen der Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung (1939), 45-56; 49 and 53. Back
70cf. RGBl. (1939), I, 444. See also Andreas Kranig, Arbeitnehmer, Arbeitsbeziehungen und Sozialpolitik unter dem Nationalsozialismus, in: Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Ed.), Deutschland 1933-1945, Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft (= Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte; Bd. 23) (1992), 135-152, 148.
71cf. RGBl. (1939), 1685, cited in Hachtmann (1989), 48. Back
72Beurmann, Berufslenkung der Jugend, ein Gebot der Stunde, Die Rheinprovinz 16 (1940), 11, 299-300, 300; cf. also Stäbler (1941), 76f. Back
73RGBl. (1938), I, 652. Back
74cf. RGBl. (1939), I, 206. See also Kühne-Erfurt (Revisor), Arbeitseinsatzmaßnahmen zur Verbesserung des Altersaufbaues in den Betrieben, in: W. Sommer (Ed.), Die Praxis des Arbeitsamtes, Eine Gemeinschaftsarbeit von Angehörigen der Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung (1939), 87-120, spec. 110-117; Leopold Ost, ZurDienstverpflichtung von Jugendlichen, Das junge Deutschland 34 (1940), 3, 66-68. But see also interrogation record Emil S., Düsseldorf (September 1940), NWHStAD, RW 58/13128, Bl. 9; interrogation record Otto H., Wuppertal (1941), NWHStAD, RW 58/22330, Bl. 23; Der Jugendführer des Deutschen Reichs, Kriminalität und Gefährdung der Jugend, Lagebericht bis zum Stande v. 1. Januar 1941 (cited in: Lagebericht Reichsjugendführung 1941), in: Arno Klönne (Ed.), Jugendkriminalität und Jugendopposition im NS-Staat, Ein sozialgeschichtliches Dokument (= Geschichte der Jugend 1) (1981), 147f. Back
75Carsten Ullmann, Zum Kriegseinsatz der deutschen Jugend 1939 bis 1945, in: Deutsche Jugend im Zweiten Weltkrieg (1991), 33-42, 36.
76Based on 1,320 valid cases. Back
77cf. Kenkmann (1996), 345.
79See Bernd-A. Rusinek, Desintegration und gesteigerter Zwang. Die Chaotisierung der Lebensverhältnisse im Bombenkrieg der Großstädte. Der Mythos der Ehrenfelder Gruppe, in: Wilfried Breyvogel, Piraten, Swings und Junge Garde. Jugendwiderstand im Nationalsozialismus (1991), 283. See also Karl-Heinz Jahnke and Michael Buddrus, Deutsche Jugend 1933-1945. Eine Dokumentation (1989), 463-468; also Schreiben des Führers der RAD-Abteilung 3/215 in Lüttelforst an den Führer des Arbeitsgaues XXI in Düsseldorf über den Duisburger RAD-Angehörigen Helmut S. (18. Februar 1943), NWHStAD, RW 58/16636, Bl. 39.
80Heinrich Jocks, Die Jugendkriminalität im Amtsgerichtsbezirk Bottrop in den Jahren 1933-1953 (1957), 60.
81Lagebericht des Generalstaatsanwalts Hamm (30. September 1943), BAK, R 22/3367, Bl. 173.
82Interrogation record Bernhard K., Duisburg (Januar 1944), NWHStAD, RW 58/8057, Bl. 15.
83Interrogation record Heinrich H., Krefeld, NWHStAD, Bestand Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht Krefeld (Rep. 30), Bd. 106, Bl. 61.
84Schreiben der Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, Düsseldorf, an die Düsseldorfer Gestapo (9. Dezember 1942), NWHStAD, RW 58/29376, Bl. 47. See also Schreiben der Kraftwagengesellschaft Dr. Wittenstein, Wuppertal-Unterbarmen, an die Gestapoaußendienststelle Wuppertal (17. Mai 1944), NWHStAD, Bestand Staatsanwaltschaft beim Landgericht Wuppertal (Rep. 92), Bd. 97, Bl. 26.
85cf. interrogation record Klaus B., Köln (Dezember 1942), NWHStAD, Bestand Sondergericht Köln (Rep. 112), Bd. 18705, Bl. 333.
86Zeugenaussage eines Düsseldorfer Betriebsobmannes (1942), NWHStAD, RW 58/575, unpaged.
87Bericht über die dritte Sitzung der Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Jugendbetreuung in Berlin (20. Oktober 1942), BAK, R 22/1197, Bl. 146.
88Beschluß der endgültigen Fürsorgeerziehung über Manfred K., Essen, durch das Amtsgericht Essen-Steele (21. Oktober 1944), Archiv des Landschaftsverbandes Rheinland (ALVR), Bd. 17356, unpaged. Back
89Schreiben des Jugendamts Gladbeck an den Leiter der Nebenstelle Gladbeck des Arbeitsamtes Bottrop (12. Mai 1949), StA Gladbeck, D 66, unpaged.
90Rudolf Sieverts, Gegenwartsfragen des deutschen Jugendrechts, Jahrbuch der Jugendarbeit 1 (1949), 59f.
91Harald Jaeger, Die Kriminalität der 14- bis 18jährigen Mädchen im Landgerichtsbezirk Wuppertal während der Jahre 1942-1952 (1963), 170.
92Arbeitsamt Wuppertal, Betr.: Maßnahmen gegen Arbeitsvertragsbruch und Arbeitsbummelei (1. Juli 1946), StA Wuppertal, Mitteilungen der Militär-Regierung für den Stadtkreis Wuppertal, Nr. 172 (6. Juli 1946).
93Der Oberpräsident der Nord-Rheinprovinz, Dr. Fuchs, Betr.: Verordnung über die Leistung von Pflichtarbeit, StA Wuppertal, Mitteilungen der Militär-Regierung für Wuppertal, 33 (31. Juli 1945). See also: Alfons Kenkmann, Jugendliche ”Arbeitsbummelanten” und die Akteure der sozialen Kontrolle gegen Ende des ”Dritten Reichs” und während der Besatzungszeit, in: Burkhard Dietz, Ute Lange and Manfred Wahle (Ed.), Jugend zwischen Selbst- und Fremdbestimmung. Historische Jugendforschung zum rechtsrheinischen Industriegebiet im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (1996), 273f.
94cf. Schreiben des Jugendamtes Gladbeck an den Vorsitzenden des Arbeitsamtes Bottrop (20. Juni 1947), StA Gladbeck, D 66, unpaged.